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Depth appears between us and every being 
that we encounter.1  Indeed, it is necessary 
that there be some relation that absents and 
disconnects us from other beings if we are 
ever to be present to and connected with 
beings that have their own identities.  
Mechanical causation, life, perception and 
cognition all depend on structures of 
connection and disconnection, and therefore 
must be constituted within a relational 
structure whose form is akin to depth.  To 
the extent that living, perceiving and 
cognising beings constitute themselves, they 
are explicitly dependent on such relations of 
presence and absence, connection and 
disconnection, and for such beings this 
relational structure is thus inherently in 
question.  The interrelation between our 
identities as living, perceiving, cognising, 
philosophising beings and the identity of 
other beings is thus manifest for us as an 
ontological issue in our experience of 
depth.2  
It is precisely because such ontological 
issues are manifest in our experience of 
depth that I here explore the philosophy of 
Descartes and Berkeley through a critical 
study of their accounts of visual depth 
perception.  My study traces philosophical-
experiential struggles in which the 
phenomena of depth push and pull two 
philosophical perceivers, Descartes and 
Berkeley, toward two different sorts of 
idealism about the objects of vision and our 
relation to them, toward two different sorts 
of ‘optical idealism.’  I gather arguments 
from across each philosopher’s corpus, 
synthesising a coherent account of visual 
depth perception that in my understanding 
accurately reflects the general drift of each 
philosopher’s project.  I present each 
account so as to mark the propulsive 
tensions inherent in each philosopher’s 
critical relation to the fundamental question 
manifest in our experience of depth. 
The fundamental question could be put 
in the following way: how is it possible that 
we experience objects as appearing outside 
of us or as different from us, if objects 
precisely make their appearance inside of us 
or in unity with us just in virtue of being 
experienced by us?  For Descartes and 
Berkeley this question is interdependent 
with the question of how we experience 
objects as being at a determinate depth, at a 
particular distance.3   Both philosophers 
appeal to the concept of language to take up 
these interdependent questions.  In my 
studies I first show how Descartes’s and 
Berkeley’s differing fundamental 
convictions about the origin of our ideas 
lead to differing conceptions of a ‘language 
of depth.’  The main difference is that in 
Descartes’s doctrine motions can cause 
ideas in us, whereas in Berkeley’s doctrine 
only mind can cause ideas.4   For Descartes, 
the language of depth therefore ends up 
being a causal code, whereas for Berkeley 
the language of depth is an arbitrary sign 
system whose meaning is caused by mind.  
But in both cases instituting a language of 
depth already idealises our interrelation to 
the object seen in depth.  The second step in 
each of my studies traces the tensions that 
follow from this initial idealisation, to show 
how it demands a further idealisation with 
broader metaphysical implications.  God 
must be an ideal guarantee of Descartes’s 
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causal encoding, and God must naturalise 
the meaning of the arbitrary sign system of 
Berkeley’s visual language.  In both cases 
the human experience of depth devolves 
from an ideality found in God, beyond 
human experience. 
In the conclusion I will suggest how 
the particular problems that appear within 
Descartes’s and Berkeley’s accounts of 
depth perception, insofar as these problems 
precipitate into their broader philosophical 
projects, mark complexities in the clear-cut 
doctrines that we sometimes mean to 
indicate when we deem Descartes a 
rationalist and Berkeley an empiricist.  I will 
also show how these problems are rooted in 
a conception of depth experience that is 
common to Descartes and Berkeley, and 
suggest that we must shift away from this 
conception of depth experience if we are to 
get past the problems that appear in their 
accounts. 
Descartes and the Encoding of 
Depth 
The Conversion of the Visible into 
Motion and Thought 
Descartes responds to the fundamental 
problem posed by the connections and 
disconnections manifest in our experience of 
depth by arguing that our ideas of things are 
different from what is in things 
themselves—that is, he deals with the 
problem by embracing it and idealising the 
connecting disconnection between our ideas 
and things.  In the beginning of The World, 
he argues for this idealisation in the case of 
light, by comparing light to language.  Just 
as words “bear no resemblance to the things 
they signify,” nature could also have 
established “some sign which would make 
us have the sensation of light.”5   Even if 
nature in itself contains nothing like light, 
things in nature can be so organised as to 
produce signs in us that cause us to have 
ideas of light that refer back to things qua 
luminous.  In the rest of The World, 
Descartes specifies how this ‘sign system’ 
works by showing how a system of 
determinate, lawful motions can cause ideas 
in us that correspond to everything that we 
sense in the world.  Ultimately Descartes 
describes a “new world” that lies behind our 
ideas.  In itself, this new world is nothing 
other than continuous uniform matter that is 
differentiated into things, properties and 
relations only by its motion, which motion is 
initiated and partly determined by the 
immanent activity of God.6   Descartes thus 
disconnects the world as given in our ideas, 
through sensations, and the “new world” as 
it is in itself.  By modelling this 
disconnection on a naturalised version of the 
relation between words and things, he re-
connects ideas and things through a causal 
system. In this causal system light itself is 
moving matter, so the light that we 
experience is encoded as motion. 
Descartes’s causal system is so transparent 
to our ideas of vision that in everyday 
experience we take our visual idea of the 
experienced world to be identical with 
things in the world, failing to see that the 
world in itself is the “new world” of motion. 
This is much the same, according to 
Descartes, as failing to notice that we are 
speaking in one language or another in 
everyday situations where language 
becomes transparent and unnoticed.7  
Descartes’s conception of light as 
motion is crucial to his later work, the 
Optics, which is my main concern here.8   In 
the beginning of the Optics, Descartes 
declares that he treats light only to explain 
how its rays enter the eye, and he does this 
only in order to explain sight.  He then 
posits three “comparisons,” that is, models, 
for light, which are only supposed to 
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facilitate the reader’s comprehension of 
light’s behaviour.  But these models 
conceive light as motion.  The philosophical 
program articulated in The World thus 
pervades the roots of the account of vision 
in the Optics. 
This is most important in Descartes’s 
very first comparison, which compares light 
to a blind man’s stick.  A blind man can 
discern qualities of an object without the 
object changing the identity or structure of 
the stick as medium—no determinations of 
things as such travel through the stick, the 
stick just moves as a whole within a larger 
framework.  To the blind man, the 
differences between mud, tree, rock, and so 
on, can be “nothing other than the various 
ways of moving the stick or resisting its 
movements”; the “resistance or movement 
of the bodies” is “the sole cause of the 
sensations he has of them.”  The blind man 
can ‘see’ these differences, but he ‘sees’ 
them through resistances that “are nothing 
like the ideas he forms of them [the 
bodies].”  Likewise we can consider light to 
be a motion whose determinations are 
nothing like our ideas of colour, light or 
coloured bodies.9  If the blind man can ‘see’ 
using motion, then the sighted man can too, 
and if the proximate cause of our vision is 
motion that is not in itself coloured, or lit, or 
luminous, or otherwise like the visible, then 
the ideas that we derive from motion would 
not be at all like the visible properties that 
are in things themselves. 
Descartes’s idealisation of the 
connection between our ideas and things is 
not just a positive move that claims that 
motion is sufficient to convey ideas of the 
luminous—there is a negative moment too, 
since Descartes argues that there are no 
ideas outside of us.  Like the stick, the only 
thing that ‘passes through’ light is motion.  
There is no internal structure in light itself 
that ties the motion of one ray of light to 
another, there is no ‘travelling’ mediator 
internal to light that carries semblances of 
visible qualities from the object to the eye.  
Such an internal structure in light is not 
necessary, since signs need not “resemble 
the things they signify,” as is shown by the 
case of words.10   And there could not be 
any such internal structure in light, since 
light in itself is only motion, and since 
images and sensations are not ‘out there’ in 
the world, they are in the ideas of the mind 
only.  By conceiving light as motion, 
Descartes eliminates the scholastic’s 
intentional species “flitting through the air” 
from thing to mind,11  and he eliminates any 
other theory that claims that the visible is a 
phenomenon that constitutes itself outside of 
us. Unlike the obscure apparatus of 
scholastic doctrine, which is repugnant to 
Descartes, moving matter is clear and 
distinct, it can be described mathematically 
with universally applicable laws, without 
requiring singular or particular internal 
principles to secure the identity of different 
things.  God could create the “new world” in 
Descartes’s mathematical form.12  
On the one hand, this means that we 
can explain the fact that we experience 
things as being beyond us in space, without 
supposing that there are intelligible forms in 
things themselves that travel to us through 
space.  In effect, the latter supposition puts 
our mind outside us in things, begging the 
question inherent in our experience of depth, 
which is that we are limited to one locus 
within space but can perceive things that are 
not identical with this locus.  (Here we must 
remember that while the Cartesian mind is 
distinct from the body, it is united with the 
body and is thus limited to a location, even 
if this unity is problematic.)  On the other 
hand, this means that we must eliminate all 
the intelligibility that could be intrinsic to 
motions that are exterior to us. 
We see this elimination of intrinsic 
intelligibility in Descartes’s description of 
the nerve fibres that mediate between the 
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eyes (which receive the motions of light) 
and the brain.  The behaviour of nerve fibres 
is precisely homologous to that of light—
they conduct nothing other than independent 
motions (fibres do not interfere with one 
another, just as light rays do not interfere 
with one another).  Moreover, Descartes’s 
arguments concerning nerve fibres are 
essentially the same as those used in the 
case of light; for example, Descartes again 
uses a comparison with the blind man to 
argue that in themselves the fibres do not 
contain images that are sensible—at most 
they contain intelligible signs of the 
sensible.13  
Outside of the mind there are just 
independent motions, and there is nothing 
internal to motions that constitutes anything 
like an image, idea, form, and so on, of the 
object or its visible qualities.  There is no 
sense in talking about resemblances 
between, for example, projections on the 
back of the eye and the visible, for such 
‘images’ have no integrity, identity or 
internal constitution that would make them 
into images.  Thus “the soul does not need 
to contemplate any images resembling the 
things which it perceives.”14   It is only 
through the constitutive work of soul that 
these independent motions are put together 
to become ideas of the visible and of the 
visible’s qualities: “it is the soul which sees, 
and not the eye.”15  
The Encoding of Depth, and 
Disconnections in Descartes’s Account 
Descartes’s analysis idealises the connecting 
disconnection between mind and things, by 
turning vision into a thought that is caused 
by a multiplicity of motions.  But these 
motions are not in themselves visible, 
precisely because they are the precondition 
for visibility.  For just this reason, 
Descartes’s analysis must presuppose an 
intelligible world of motion that has 
determinate structures that mediate optical 
motion to the eyes, nerves and brain.  If 
Descartes’s model of light is to explain how 
objects cause vision, then the seen, the seer, 
the seer’s eye, and so on, must be embedded 
in a space that has a determinate geometry 
and optics.  If motions in the eye are to 
provide the soul with determinate signs of 
objects then there must be an already extant, 
self-sufficient, determinate and uniform 
“geometry” of the nerve fibres to connect 
motion to the eye and the brain.  Most 
important, if objects are the cause of our 
seeing things and if our ideas of objects are 
true—if vision is of the world—then the 
motions of the light and nerve fibres, and the 
soul’s decoding of motion in the brain, must 
already be guaranteed to allow us to both 
successfully constitute ideas of objects and 
have these ideas be true to their objects, 
even if the being of these ideas is nothing 
like the being of their objects.  There must 
be a guarantee that the encoding that 
connects ideas to objects is true to the 
world. 
Descartes seeks this sort of guarantee 
in the Meditations, namely, a guarantee that 
thought can be thought of the world and that 
ideas caused in us are non-deceptive in 
letting us get a true idea of the world.  In the 
Meditations, Descartes articulates this 
guarantee in terms of judgement, and tries to 
secure it through an argument whose first 
step necessarily has a reflexive 
transcendental form, and whose subsequent 
steps depend on the discovery of the idea of 
a supremely perfect and hence existent God 
within thought’s content. 
In the Optics, Descartes does not 
explicitly seek such a guarantee for sight, 
but it is clear that it must be presumed, for 
vision itself cannot guarantee, let alone see, 
the “new world” behind Descartes’s theory 
of vision.  God is really the only one with a 
comprehensive ‘outside view’ of this new 
world and the perceiver within it.  So all of 
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the structures in this “new world”—its 
space, its motion, and so on—remain ideal 
to human thought.  This becomes an issue in 
Descartes’s account of distance perception. 
Descartes’s triangulation account16  of 
distance perception depends on a point made 
in his account of the visual perception of 
position, namely, that the disposition of the 
parts of the body relative to one another 
(such as the direction of the eye or head) is 
registered by motions in the brain.  Given 
knowledge of the disposition of body parts, 
the soul can know the position of a seen 
object by locating it on straight lines that 
“we can imagine to be drawn” by an 
inferential process that amounts to following 
the path of light rays back from the eye to 
the object.17   Distance perception is just a 
triangulation based on the same operation: 
given the distance along the baseline 
between the two eyes, and the angle 
between the optic axes of the eyes and the 
baseline (the vergence angle), the soul can 
know “as if by a natural geometry” the 
distance between the object and the baseline.  
Descartes likens this to a blind man judging 
the distance between himself and an object 
given two sticks, knowledge of the distance 
between his two hands, knowledge of the 
angles that the sticks make, and so on.18   
Descartes even notes that one eye is 
sufficient for this triangulation, if the eye’s 
position is changed.19  
This account of distance perception 
marks at least two distinguishable 
circularities in Descartes’s argument.  The 
first circularity spins itself out around an 
epistemological skepticism.  If knowing the 
space in which objects are located (which I 
call “world-space”) depends on seeing 
distance, but seeing distance in world-space 
requires an operation of thought that must, 
as such, be carried out on a space that is 
only thought (which I call “thought-space”) 
and that is ideally disconnected from world-
space, then we must already know that 
operations in thought-space can yield results 
true to world-space.  But to know this 
explicitly, we would already need to know 
the characteristics of world-space that make 
it match up with thought-space.  In order to 
know world-space, one already has to know 
world-space. 
Descartes cannot get out of this 
circularity by saying that some sense other 
than sight provides us with a more 
fundamental knowledge of world-space—
precisely because of the drift of Descartes’s 
program, all senses are just motions that 
have been booted into the realm of 
perception by thought, so all senses yield 
knowledge of distance only through thought.  
Knowledge of distance in all cases is the 
result of a transition from motions 
determinate within world-space, to thoughts 
determinate within thought-space.  The 
determinacy of this transition is external to 
both human thought and the world of 
motions, it is somehow ‘between’ them.  
Like Archimedes, Descartes would need a 
standpoint that is out of this world and 
beyond human intellect if he is to carry off 
his project and show how we can see the 
depths of the world, but there is no such 
standpoint for a human intellect.  So 
Descartes has to presume that thought-space 
does indeed map onto world-space, but there 
is no intellectual intuition or idea from sense 
that could possibly confirm this.  The object 
of such an idea is in itself both beyond the 
ken and the experiential reach of human 
being, it transcends us.  This idea could only 
be in God, it is external to us, it is 
approached only through the reflections of 
the Meditations and only insofar as our ideas 
of geometry and optics are clear and 
distinct. 
The second circularity is more down to 
earth but has a similar structure.  In order to 
perceive the distance from the seer to the 
object in the world, one already has to know 
other distances in the world that are required 
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for triangulation, namely, the distance 
between two eyes or the distance between 
two locations of one eye, as well as the 
vergence angle of the eyes.  I call these 
distances “grounding distances,” since they 
ground the triangulation procedure.20   If 
thought infers the determinacy of depth from 
signs given it, yet the given signs only have 
their determinacy in relation to grounding 
distances, then thought’s inference must be 
grounded on direct and immediate signs of 
grounding distances.  If thought had to infer 
grounding distances in the same way that it 
has to infer the distance to the object, then 
there would be an endless regress. 
Descartes cannot rid himself of this 
circularity by saying that another sense can 
provide thought with grounding distances 
for vision.  We could try touching our eyes 
to measure the baseline between them, but 
given Descartes’s treatment of the senses, 
tactile distance would equally be the result 
of an inference that recovers a distance that 
depends on yet other grounding distances—
in this case the relative angular disposition 
at all the joints in the body and the length of 
the joints, which length must again be 
measured, somehow.  Instead of getting into 
these endless and somewhat absurd circles, 
Descartes tacitly and quite sensibly 
presumes that we just know these grounding 
distances, because our body and nervous 
system are so configured as to provide us 
with this knowledge, and we cannot ask any 
further questions. The significant point here 
is that the fundamental structures of body 
through which alone we know the world 
must therefore be logically and ideally 
external to the world of our experience.  
That is to say, even though we can take the 
measure of our bodies as things, this 
measure depends on a prior knowledge of 
grounding distances, and these grounding 
distances must be ‘known’ independently of 
our knowledge of the world.  Consequently, 
grounding distances are not distances in the 
world, they do not really belong to the body 
as a thing.  The body has a peculiar ideality, 
it has measures that must be external to the 
metrical space of the perceived world, since 
the body is the sole ground of our perceiving 
the world and its measures.  But if 
perception of distance is perception of a 
distance in the world, if it is a distance 
inferred by the soul through motions in the 
world that are conducted through the system 
of objects, light, body, eyes, refraction, 
nerve fibres and the brain, then the ideal 
body must also have a determinate, albeit 
ideal, relation to the worldly body that can 
become the object of our perception or of 
others’s perceptions and that can be 
measured as a thing.  The peculiarly ideal 
body is doubled. 
Descartes’s ways of avoiding the 
above circularities, then, oblige him to 
tacitly posit an already determined ideal 
body that is disconnected from an already 
determined world-space, space as it is in 
itself; and these again are disconnected from 
thought-space.21   On a methodological and 
metaphysical level, these disconnections beg 
the question of the connections between 
these different spaces, which connections 
are necessary if we are to perceive things in 
depth.  Within the framework of his larger 
philosophical project, Descartes’s strategy 
for connecting the different spaces amounts 
to digging into intellect and being, and 
retrieving a core of intelligibility and clarity 
that unites these different spaces in light of 
God.  Briefly, the mathematical 
intelligibility of the motion that determines 
optical behaviour and “natural geometry” is 
in a certain sense the apparent form of the 
intelligible connection between world-space 
and thought-space, between being and 
thinking; the combination of the self-
clarifying thought which is the cogito and 
the idea of God discovered within this 
thought are the opening through which 
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thought eventually discovers and grounds its 
intelligible linkage to being. 
These spaces, their structure, their 
content and their connection, therefore, are 
not in themselves ideal for us (even if they 
may be ideal in themselves for God).  They 
are only ideal and thinkable when they have 
been re-constituted by human thought and 
for human thought, and they can be re-
constituted in this way only because God 
has already set up the world so that it 
encodes signs that cause us to decode just 
the right ideas about the world.  The root of 
the ideality of space is ultimately alien to 
human thought.  Descartes argues that we 
can have ideas of things other than 
ourselves, things in depth, because our ideas 
are disconnected from things in the way that 
words are disconnected from things meant.  
But Descartes insists that the connection 
between ‘visual words’ and things in depth 
is mediated by an encoding natural 
geometry that is concretised in motions.  
This means that each word in his language 
of depth depends on a doubling: each word 
arises in a system of motions that has value 
both as an ideal measure in a calculative 
system internal to mind, and as a stretch of 
matter or motion in a natural world that is 
not itself ideal (for human mind).  The 
encoding connection that bridges this 
doubling between idea and nature is 
precisely excluded from our knowing, since 
it grounds our knowing.  To inspect the 
basis of the encoding language, we would 
already need to be able to interpret this 
language, to see things in depth; and we 
would have to be able to turn this language 
of depth onto itself, to see how thought-
space gibes with world-space.  But turning 
this language of depth onto its encoding 
mechanism does not break us out of the 
language of depth, it just gives us further 
words of the language, not the things 
themselves.  Descartes cannot use the 
language of depth to get at its own roots any 
more than he can use a lens to magnify its 
own surface, unless he reflects the lens in a 
mirror—but this requires a pure, ideal 
reflection external to the causal language of 
depth, a cogito beyond perception.  
Descartes’s encoding language of depth, 
which naturalises the sign-signified relation 
in a causal system, depends on an ideality 
that doubles space and the body, an ideality 
that can never present itself in perception.  
As we shall see, Berkeley attacks this 
doubling and its consequences by banishing 
external geometry and other ‘natural’ non-
mindful terms from his account, thus 
internalising all significance within the 
words of his language of depth—but he too 
will have to naturalise his language of depth. 
Berkeley’s Inwardness and the 
Visual Language of Outness 
Visual Language and the Inwardness of 
Depth 
In the beginning of the Essay Towards a 
New Theory of Vision (hereafter, NTV) 
Berkeley makes the famous claim that 
“distance, of itself and immediately, cannot 
be seen.”  This is because “distance being a 
line directed endwise to the eye, it projects 
only one point in the fund [i.e., retina] of the 
eye, which point remains invariably the 
same whether the distance be longer or 
shorter.”22   Distance must therefore be 
perceived by means of some other idea that 
is an immediate idea of sense (i.e., a 
sensation).23   This hints at two doctrines 
that fundamentally shape Berkeley’s entire 
account—that all ideas must originate in 
ideas immediately perceived, and that 
distance cannot be immediately perceived.24   
Already this embeds distance and depth 
within ideas and disconnects them from a 
non-ideal realm.  Berkeley’s task in NTV is 
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to identify the immediate ideas of sense that 
do allow us to see distance, and to describe 
the connections between these ideas and 
ideas of distance. 
Berkeley divides distance perception 
into two cases, long range and short range.  
In long range distance perception ideas such 
as the faintness of the target object can tell 
us the distance between ourselves and the 
target.  But Berkeley claims that only 
experience can teach us the connection 
between ideas such as faintness and ideas of 
distance.  Nothing outside mind could cause 
us to make this connection.25  
Likewise, in short range distance 
perception there is no necessary connection 
between immediate ideas and ideas of 
distance.  But the argument in this case is 
played out on quite different ground.  In 
long range distance perception, there is 
nothing internal to ideas such as faintness 
that could establish its connection to ideas 
of distance.  When looking at near objects, 
however, the connection between distance 
and determinations of the eyes such as their 
vergence angle seems to be a causal 
connection explained by the laws of optics, 
geometry, and so on, that is, by laws 
external to experience.  As we have seen, 
this is Descartes’s doctrine. 
In NTV Berkeley begins to make his 
case against this doctrine through several 
empirical criticisms of Cartesian accounts.  
Against the Cartesian triangulation account, 
Berkeley argues that we have no immediate 
experience of the vergence angle of the 
eyes.26   Similarly, we are not conscious of 
computing distance through a triangulation 
procedure.27   So the triangulation account 
does not accurately reflect our experience of 
distance perception.  My criticism of 
Descartes’s account showed that even if we 
could know the distances that ground 
triangulation, these distances would have to 
be ideal with respect to us, and likewise the 
geometry and calculation that let us judge 
the distance.  Berkeley fences off this 
criticism entirely by confining his 
explanation all and only to experience—no 
ideal posits external to mind can figure in 
his account.  But precisely because this 
fencing off depends on facts, it is not fatal—
in principle it is possible for us to discover 
some other immediate idea that is 
necessarily connected to distance, or for us 
to conduct operations on ideas without 
knowing that we are conducting them.28   
Berkeley, however, takes his factual 
criticisms a step further and joins them with 
the concept of a signifying connection in 
order to reform Cartesian accounts. 
Let me explain signifying connections.  
Using the example of the redness of a blush 
on the face of a man who is ashamed, 
Berkeley argues that we cannot immediately 
perceive that the man is ashamed.  Redness 
in the face is not identical to shame—
redness could also signify anger or a 
disease.29   There is no necessary connection 
between the two such that we could infer 
shame from the idea of redness itself 
without reference to our experience.  Even 
so, this particular way of turning red in fact 
always accompanies shame.  So once we 
have learnt this connection from experience, 
“no sooner shall he behold that color to arise 
in the face of another but it brings into his 
mind the idea of that passion which has been 
observed to accompany it.”30   Strong 
connections between ideas can be based on a 
signification taught by experience, yet the 
connections need not be necessary.  I call 
such connections signifying connections, 
and the idea that signifies another idea (for 
example, the redness) a signifying idea. 
We are now prepared to follow the 
Bishop’s reform of the Cartesian account.  
Berkeley replaces the immediate idea of the 
vergence angle, which we do not in fact 
experience, with “the sensation arising from 
the turn of the eyes,” which is “immediately 
perceived.”31   In the Cartesian account the 
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vergence angle is a measure embedded 
within a geometry, so the angle necessarily 
connects to the distance of the object.  The 
turn of the eyes is just an immediate 
sensation that has no internal connection to 
any other idea, so the connection between it 
and distance must be a signifying 
connection. 
In a discussion of another Cartesian 
account, one that claims that at close range 
distance is inversely proportional to the 
divergence of light rays entering one pupil, 
Berkeley gives a cognate criticism: we 
experience neither the divergence of light 
rays nor a calculation based on this 
divergence.  His reform is also cognate: 
what we do experience is a blurredness 
(confusion) correlate with divergence, yet 
there is no necessary internal connection 
between blurredness and distance.  But 
Berkeley adds a bit more.  When we look at 
objects through concave mirrors or bi-
convex lenses the inverse proportionality 
between divergence and the apparent 
distance of the object does not necessarily 
hold, whereas an inverse proportion between 
blurredness and the apparent distance does 
hold.  However, in the case of looking 
through concave mirrors or bi-convex 
lenses, the usual relation between 
blurredness and the actual distance of the 
object is reversed—things can look blurrier 
when they are actually moved away from us, 
even if they appear to be looming toward us.  
Berkeley likens this to encountering a 
foreigner “who uses the same words with 
the English, but in a direct contrary 
signification.”32   Signifying connections, 
however, can accommodate this reversal of 
meaning. 
The above criticisms, though, are still 
empirical.  A critic could argue that while 
nothing internal to the idea of the turn of the 
eyes connects it to distance, this idea is just 
another name for the vergence angle of the 
eyes, and likewise blurredness is just 
another name for divergence.  So really 
there are necessary connections here, and 
one only need take account of the optical 
situation of the eye in order to re-establish 
these necessary connections, even when the 
eye is looking through lenses.  Or, the critic 
could say that if our eyes did not turn a 
certain way because a certain vergence 
angle is required if they are to point toward 
the object, then the turn of the eyes could 
tell us nothing about distance.  If Berkeley 
denies this causal relation he will get into a 
circle, says the critic: if our eyes somehow 
signify the distance of the object on their 
own, then Berkeley will not be able to tell us 
what distance is in the first place, such that 
it can be connected with the turn of the 
eyes—distance would have to be intrinsic 
within our ideas in some way, rather than 
being ‘out there,’ which is absurd.  But 
Berkeley’s argument precisely leads him to 
claim that distance is intrinsic within our 
ideas. 
An empirical, positive argument, 
however critical, cannot secure Berkeley’s 
claim that no system of external or 
necessary connections suffices to explain 
our experience of distance.  For Berkeley, it 
is ultimately repugnant and impossible that 
any immediate idea on its own could cause 
us to experience things as outer.  We can 
sometimes experience vision as presenting 
us with a flattened experience (as the painter 
seemingly does).  Nothing in immediate 
ideas and nothing outside mind could cause 
these ideas to be outer, they are just ideas—
we add outness.  This seems to be the sort of 
experiential meaning that ultimately lies 
behind Berkeley’s ‘point in the fund of the 
eye argument.’33   But the critic of Berkeley 
can always add empirical detail, positing 
further layers behind experience, in order to 
rebuild necessary connections rooted in 
structures external to mind, which necessary 
connections can re-establish Cartesian 
accounts or show that “outness” is caused in 
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us.  Here we come to a problem with the 
method of the NTV.  To head off his fact 
minded critic, Berkeley needs to make a 
metaphysical argument that disconnects 
experience from external structures once and 
for all.  Berkeley’s study of distance in the 
NTV therefore demands and anticipates the 
sort of metaphysical position articulated in A 
Treatise Concerning the Principles of 
Human Knowledge (hereafter Principles).  It 
also nicely illustrates the inherent tension of 
empiricism: positive empirical claims 
cannot suffice to defend empiricism as a 
philosophical position, so empiricism 
always conceals a certain idealism, a 
negative moment, at its core. 
Let me therefore make good on the 
argument of the NTV by appealing to a 
doctrine established in the later Principles, 
namely, that there can be no necessary 
connections between any ideas.  Berkeley 
argues for his doctrine in the following way.  
When we attend to our ideas, we find no 
power or activity within them.  As passive, 
an idea has no power to cause itself or any 
other idea to exist, and ideas thus have no 
power to cause themselves or cause their 
connections to other ideas.  Instead, each 
idea is caused to be and is connected to 
other ideas by a cause or power outside it.  
Berkeley calls the outside cause “mind” or 
“spirit.”34  
Thus there cannot be any internal or 
necessary connections between ideas.  
Moreover, the human mind does not 
experience itself as establishing the 
configuration and sequence of immediate 
ideas of sense.  Instead, it apprehends that 
certain ideas always accompany one 
another, just as shame always accompanies 
blushing.  Mind thus learns the signifying 
connections between ideas in the same way 
that mind learns a new language.  We have 
already seen one case in which Berkeley 
explicitly compares vision to language, and 
it is not difficult to find other instances in 
which this comparison is explicit, thematic 
and central.  In the Theory of Vision or 
Visual Language Vindicated and Explained 
(hereafter VL), which is written after 
Principles, Berkeley puts the doctrine of the 
Principles in the following way: “Ideas, 
which are observed to be connected together 
are vulgarly considered under the relation of 
cause and effect, whereas, in strict and 
philosophic truth, they are only related as 
sign to the thing signified.”35   Language, 
then, replaces causality and necessity.  
Berkeley begins his argument in VL by 
writing that: “I shall therefore now begin 
with that conclusion, that vision is the 
language of the Author of nature, from 
thence deducing theorems and solutions of 
phenomena, and explaining the nature of 
visible things, and the visive faculty.”36   
Descartes disconnects the being of ideas 
from the being of things while retaining an 
encoding causal connection between things 
and ideas—connections are made outside 
mind.  Berkeley internalises ideas of visual 
distance and depth within mind, and the 
connections between ideas are thus not 
external to mind but internal to mind, and 
their significance stems from experience, 
not causality.  Ideas of distance are not 
caused within us in virtue of a natural 
geometry, but we learn that certain 
immediate ideas signify the idea of distance. 
The Problem of Outness 
Berkeley’s general approach leads to a 
number of problems. 
The first problem concerns the ideas 
that let us see distance.  Above, I discussed 
the turn of the eyes and the blurredness of 
the image.  These signifying ideas must stem 
from immediate ideas of sense and must not 
make reference to objects in depth—a 
signifying idea must be prior to the mediate 
idea of the distance that it signifies.  But the 
turn of the eyes is really “the turn of the 
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eyes toward the object” and confusion is 
really “confusion of the image of the 
object.”  The turn of the eyes and the 
confusion of the image are in this sense 
posterior to the idea of the distant object, 
and signifying ideas are thus mediated by 
the idea that they signify.  If we are to see 
blurredness, for example, our eyes must 
latch onto an object outside us that has sharp 
boundaries.  But it is not clear how we can 
distinguish between blurredness due to 
distance, the medium, or the object itself 
(for example, when looking through a foggy 
window or at a blurry photograph), unless 
our vision is mediated by an idea of the 
distant object.37   There seems to be a circle 
here.  Berkeley’s account, though, is very 
effective at dealing with this circularity, 
because we are not to bother asking why or 
how a signifying idea signifies an idea of 
distance.  The fact that a signifying idea 
does accompany an idea of distance is 
sufficient to establish the signifying 
connection.  In the end, experience is to sort 
out this distinction, and in the first instance 
we do not have to know it.38  
The moment of idealism which makes 
all connections between ideas a matter of 
fact thus dissolves certain empirical 
criticisms.  But the very doctrine that gives 
this idealism its power—the doctrine that 
ideas cannot cause their connection to other 
ideas—leads to a problem with respect to 
distance.  If we cannot experience distance 
directly by sight, we must experience it in 
some other way.  But if no one immediate 
idea can on its own connect to another idea, 
how do we experience distance, which in its 
very nature would seem to be a relation 
between ideas? 
In the NTV, Berkeley claims that 
visual ideas that signify distance signify 
what we can anticipate touching after 
having moved our bodies “a certain 
distance, to be measured by the motion of 
[our] body, which is perceivable by 
touch.”39  It is true that we think that we see 
things at a distance, but “ideas of space, 
outness and things placed at a distance are 
not, strictly speaking, the object of sight; 
they are not otherwise perceived by the eye 
than by the ear.”  We do not say that we 
hear distance, but that hearing suggests to us 
the distance of a thing; likewise, we should 
not say that we see distance.40   Thus, “ideas 
of space, outness and things placed at a 
distance are not, strictly speaking, the object 
of sight”—ideas of space are signified by 
objects of sight.41   But it is evident that 
Berkeley really means that objects of sight 
signify anticipated tangible distance. So we 
must ask whether ideas of space, outness 
and things at a distance can be the object of 
the sense of touch, for if they cannot be, 
then we would have to defer explanation 
once again. 
In the NTV, tangible distance has a 
special privilege—it can be constituted 
without mind.  In NTV §45, Berkeley says 
that by a tangible idea he means an 
immediate object of sense, and we have seen 
that it can be measured off by the body.  
Berkeley also writes that for a blind man 
who is later made to see, “all those things 
which, in respect of each other, would by 
him be thought higher or lower must be such 
as were conceived to exist without his mind, 
in the ambient space.”42   In NTV, then, 
Berkeley would seem to conceive tangible 
distance as a measure of a domain that exists 
outside mind. 
In the Principles, however, Berkeley 
suggests that tangible distance too is nothing 
without mind.  In a reply to objections by 
those who claim that there are things that 
exist outside the mind, Berkeley reiterates 
the NTV’s doctrine that outness is not the 
object of sight, and just after that he claims 
that it was a “vulgar” but pragmatic error on 
his part in the NTV to suggest that tangibles 
exist without mind.  We do not touch 
distance, but our experience of touch 
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signifies the further touching that we can 
anticipate, and this anticipatory structure is 
all that we mean by distance.  Berkeley, I 
believe, would have to say: it may be that I 
have an immediate experience of the stretch 
of my arm, but this in itself could not be an 
idea of distance, just as the turn of the eyes 
is not immediately an idea of distance—the 
stretch of the arm itself signifies what I can 
anticipate touching by moving my arm, it 
signifies relationships between tangibles felt 
by my hand.  Distance is thus an object of 
the mind, not sense, precisely because 
distance is anticipatory.  The connection and 
disconnection between myself and my 
object, which is at the core of distance, is 
not rooted in external mediating structures 
that separate my being from that of my 
object, yet connect me to it causally, as in 
Descartes’s account.  Instead, according to 
Berkeley, distance is all and only an 
anticipatory—that is, temporal—connection 
within mind, a connection and disconnection 
between the ideas given in visual language, 
and thus it depends on our ability to learn 
the signifying connections of this language.  
Distance, we could say, is given by a power 
of mind, it is not a structure outside of us 
that is conveyed to mind by an external 
causality. 
This means that we must have the 
power to organise immediate ideas of sense 
into a structure, such that certain ideas go 
together in anticipating others.  But this 
organisation of immediate ideas cannot 
depend on mediate ideas of distance, since it 
is precisely supposed to explain the 
experiential origin of mediate ideas of 
distance.  At some point we must be given 
ideas independent of other ideas, which 
nonetheless lead to ideas of distance.  Mind 
learns that certain ideas signify other ideas 
only because these ideas always accompany 
one another, and not because of some 
internal connection that becomes available 
upon inspection of the less immediate idea.  
At some point, then, mind must have the 
power to make a spontaneous shift from 
having a disconnected experience of 
independent ideas, to having an idea of a 
connection between them.  The problem, 
then, is how connections between immediate 
ideas are originally formed.  More precisely, 
the problem is how, without relying on ideas 
that in fact seem to follow from such 
connections, such connections get put 
together for the first time as relevant, 
meaningful connections that make future 
experience comprehensible and regular.43   I 
call such connections regular connections.  
We must already be able to discover regular 
connections between ideas if we are to learn 
the signifying connections that will let us 
“regulate our actions, in order to attain those 
things that are necessary to the preservation 
and well-being of our bodies,” which is 
what visual language is supposed to let us 
do.44  
In Alciphron, in a discussion of the 
infamous man born blind who is made to 
see, Berkeley takes up a more limited case 
of a first encounter with the world of 
experience.  Berkeley likens this to a person 
encountering English for the first time.45   In 
such cases humans have the power to learn 
visual language or English through 
repetition, because the subject already has 
ideas of the signifieds and there is some 
other resource (a language speaker or a 
regular repeated experience) that can aid the 
subject in connecting the new signifiers (the 
English words, the objects of sight) with the 
old signifieds (men and trees referred to by 
speech, or felt by touch).  The resource 
extends experience into a new language by 
taking advantage of regular connections 
between ideas already available to the 
subject.  But I want to take seriously 
Berkeley’s claim that ideas and connections 
between ideas come from experience.  There 
must be some point at which we individually 
have no experience of connections between 
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immediate ideas. To extend Berkeley’s 
thought experiment about the blind man 
made to see, we are all at first blind to every 
dimension of experience and are just 
presented with a mass of immediate ideas 
that have no order.  It looks as if there is no 
element within this unconnected mass of 
immediate ideas that could seed the 
formation of a network of regular 
connections.  Just as Descartes removes 
meaningful form as such from the world 
outside mind, so that form must be judged 
by the mind, Berkeley removes meaningful 
form from immediate experience and makes 
it a result constituted by the mind’s power 
of forming signifying connections.  But 
what can give experience a meaningful form 
in the first place, prior to the mind’s 
experience, such that the mind’s power is 
not misguided? 
The power of the human mind will not 
suffice.  Prior to experience, the human 
mind has no way of discerning regular 
connections between immediate ideas, and 
since ideas have no internal connection to 
one another, mind can only form 
connections between ideas on the basis of 
past experience.  Without prior experience 
the human mind has no ground for choosing 
one particular connection between co-
present ideas as being more or less 
significant or regular than any other 
connection, unless it has an inbuilt 
disposition to connect ideas in some 
particular non-arbitrary fashion.  But the 
latter would imply that the human mind has 
innate ideas that do not originate in sense, 
which would contradict Berkeley’s 
doctrines.  So the ability to form regular 
connections must depend on an active cause 
other than the human mind.  But according 
to Berkeley’s doctrine in the Principles 
there is no independently subsisting matter 
that can act in this way, and the cause of 
such connections could only be another 
mind or spirit. 
In fact, for Berkeley it is the activity of 
a mind other than the human mind, namely 
the activity of God’s mind, that gives 
immediate ideas an internal organisation, at 
least in the case of vision, to which I restrict 
myself in what follows.  God’s active role in 
immediate ideas takes the form of God’s 
authorship of the visual language of 
nature.  We have already seen that the 
immediate ideas of sight constitute a 
universal language of the Author of nature.  
In Alciphron, Alciphron pursues the 
question of the origin of what I call regular 
connections of ideas by asking: “Besides, if 
vision be only a language speaking to the 
eyes, it may be asked, when did men learn 
this language?,” and moreover, “will any 
man say he has spent time or been at pains 
to learn this language of vision?”  
Euphranor’s answer invokes God’s 
language: 
If we have been all practising this language, ever 
since our first entrance into the world: if the 
Author of nature constantly speaks to the eyes of 
all mankind, even in their earliest infancy, 
whenever the eyes are open in the light, whether 
alone or in company: it doth not seem to me at all 
strange, that men should not be aware they had 
ever learned a language, begun so early, and 
practised so constantly as this of vision.  
(Alciphron, Fourth Dialogue, §11) 
Our visual experience is ordered as a 
language by the Author of nature, by a mind 
other than our own, and it has been ordered 
by this mind ever since our first entrance 
into the world. 
Berkeley’s invocation of God’s visual 
language suggests how our visual 
experience can be organised from within.  
But this still does not explain how the first 
signifier encountered becomes 
comprehensible if we do not already know 
what the signifier signifies or even that it is 
significant.  In the end, Berkeley must say 
that the signifiers of the visual language of 
the Author of nature show their own 
significance and thus point to their own 
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coherence as a regularly connected set of 
immediate ideas.  This is suggested by 
Berkeley’s claim that visual language 
awakens the mind and deserves its utmost 
attention because it is learned with little 
pains, expresses the differences between 
things clearly and aptly, and “instructs with 
such facility, and dispatch, by one glance of 
the eye conveying a greater variety of 
advices, and a more distinct knowledge of 
things, than could be got by a discourse of 
several hours.”46   In a human language new 
words have to be explained to us, and we 
engage in long discourses concerning the 
meaning of words that we already know, but 
there is something immediately self-evident 
about God’s visual language.  Its meaning 
can be revealed in a glance.  Moreover, 
God’s visual language is fixed and 
immutable, which is why the idea of a 
visible square always suggests and connects 
with the same tangible figure “in Europe as 
it does in America.”47  
God’s visual language, unlike human 
language, has a self-evidence to it, a 
possibility of explicating itself.  I would 
argue that (for Berkeley) it is only because 
visual language has this self-explicability 
and is immutable and always present that we 
can both learn about the significance of 
ideas of sight from within experience, and 
have the power to build correlations 
between sight and the other senses.  But it is 
crucial to note that for Berkeley this does 
not mean that the signifiers immediately 
contain within themselves their signified.  
God’s visual language is still a language, 
with a conventional relation between the 
sign and the signified.  The significance of 
immediate ideas cannot rest in things 
themselves, in a non-arbitrary causal 
structure, as in the case of Descartes’s 
natural geometry—if this were the case, then 
external subsistent matter would cause the 
meaning of things, subverting Berkeley’s 
entire project.  The significance of things 
rests in the convention of the language that 
is formed by immediate ideas.  Yet Berkeley 
argues that the convention of God’s 
language is arbitrary and natural: 
A great number of arbitrary signs, various and 
apposite, do constitute a language.  If such 
arbitrary connection be instituted by men, it is an 
artificial language; if by the Author of nature, it is 
a natural language. . . .  A connection established 
by the Author of nature, in the ordinary course of 
things, may surely be called natural, as that made 
by men will be called artificial.  And yet this does 
not hinder but the one may be as arbitrary as the 
other.  (VL §40) 
This tension between nature and 
arbitrariness is the ultimate contradiction 
beating at the heart of Berkeley’s account.  
To avoid skepticism Berkeley severs all 
necessary connections between ideas and all 
causal connections between mind and 
anything other than mind.  Descartes’s 
initial skepticism is articulated and 
overcome with respect to his “new world” of 
moving matter—our ideas are truly about 
the “new world” because of its natural 
causal structure, even if the being of our 
ideas is nothing like the being of this world.  
But because there is a difference between 
ideas and their object, there is a possibility 
of error, except that God has encoded the 
relation between matter and our ideas 
through the causal system of the world, 
optics, body and mind—through natural 
geometry—in just the right way.  Berkeley 
trumps skepticism by doing away with the 
whole framework that renders it coherent, 
by turning mind inward into its own 
territory.  Relations between ideas must be 
arbitrary in the sense that they have no 
necessary external standard.  But in trying to 
rid himself of skepticism by turning inward, 
Berkeley must hold fast to the opposite of 
skepticism, to the claim that there is a 
comprehensibly ordered experience that can 
render itself coherent and true.  There still 
must be a natural order to ideas.  But the 
human mind does not have the power to 
15 
organise its own network of ideas from the 
ground up, else it would have to rely on 
innate ideas, an outside standard and another 
inroad for skepticism.  Yet there still must 
be a source for the natural organisation of 
experience—an a priori coiled in the heart 
of experience.  Some other mind—God’s 
mind—must come into the mix and sort 
experience out.  So for Berkeley, experience 
of depth requires a connection to God’s 
mind, over against the human mind.  
Distance is not due solely to the power of 
the human mind, and the true object of 
distance perception is God qua author of 
nature. 
The tension between nature and 
arbitrariness has important implications for 
Berkeley’s account of distance.  While  
“outness,” depth and distance are not to be 
located in an extended matter or absolute 
space outside human mind, “outness” and 
distance do relate human mind to God’s 
natural ordering of the content of 
experience.  Distance, then, has a double 
structure for Berkeley too.  Distance is an 
anticipation based on human experience, it 
is rooted in the power of human mind to 
connect ideas in disconnection from any 
material cause; but the possibility of this 
anticipatory system and power depends on 
the natural structure of ideas that is given to 
human mind by God; thus our experience of 
distance connects us with an ideal structure 
that is both connected and disconnected 
from us.  A similar doubling and relation to 
an ideal structure would hold for space, 
although I shall not make the argument 
here.48  
The Ideality of Being In Space 
I would now like to give a compressed 
‘phenomenological portrait’ of the Cartesian 
and Berkeleian accounts, emphasising the 
way that conceptions of depth phenomena 
and conceptions of our optical relations to 
things lead each account to an idealism 
about depth and space. 
The Cartesian account could be 
portrayed as follows.  My experience of 
depth perception entails that I experience 
space as an unshakeably pervasive structure 
that undergirds the very possibility of there 
being things that are distinguishable from 
me.  But space then undergirds my 
possibility of being, so I am a being in space 
too.  Since I am in space, I can never be 
present to space as a whole, I can only 
directly experience the locus of points 
occupied by my body.  But this is just to say 
that there is a determinate space beyond me 
that I do not directly experience.  While I 
cannot directly experience space as such, 
since I cannot be immediately connected 
with something that precisely exceeds me, 
all things are like my body in having a 
determinate location and way of being 
within the determinate structure of space.  
So there is a determinate connection 
between my sensory surfaces and things in 
space.  For example, light travels in a 
determinate manner through space toward 
my eyes.  In the right circumstances I can 
therefore infer the spatial determinations of 
things other than me by the sensory effects 
that they cause in my body, through the 
connecting disconnection of light.  But my 
experience cannot escape this inferential 
process to directly experience the ‘outside’ 
view that would secure this inference.  I am 
in space like other things are in space, and 
yet I have ideas of things at a distance from 
me, which ideas are nothing like things 
themselves.  But this just means that my 
natural, causal body and the natural, causal 
language of depth must be shadowed by 
ideal doubles that guarantee that the 
encoding language of depth and my 
decoding body are capable of yielding a 
veridical experience of depth.  The ideality 
that supports the causal language of depth 
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recedes behind experience, because it is 
presupposed by the experience of depth. 
The same fundamental phenomenon 
motivates the Berkeleian account, but leads 
to quite a different result.  It is true that I 
cannot experience space as a whole, since I 
am in space.  But this is not because of the 
material limitation that I cannot make 
immediate contact with material beyond me, 
it is because my experience consists in 
immediate ideas that are disconnected from 
one another and disconnected from anything 
else.  To say that I am in space and have an 
experience of depth, is to say that I am 
related to ideas that have a unity beyond me.  
But the immediate ideas I am given in 
experience have no internal relational 
structure of their own.  The relational 
structure in virtue of which I am in space 
and related to things in depth must be due to 
my power of connecting ideas, and to this 
extent it is based in arbitrary relational 
possibilities that are given to my mind.  But 
insofar as my experience is naturally 
comprehensible and the space that I 
experience in fact exceeds me, this relational 
structure cannot be arbitrary and cannot 
originate in my power alone.  It must be due 
to the power of God, in virtue of whom this 
relational structure is already latent within 
possibilities given me in experience.  Here 
too we find an ideality, namely, that of the 
linguistic structure of ideas. 
The Cartesian and Berkeleian accounts 
both interpret the fundamental experience of 
depth perception as indicating that we are in 
space.  With the preposition “in” I mean to 
mark a certain insularity and ideality.  We 
are present to a space from which we are 
also fundamentally absent, since space in its 
very presence exceeds us in such a way that 
our ideas of space can only connect with 
space as words connect with things.  To be 
specific, the body with which the Cartesian 
“I” is united is present as extended matter in 
space, but the Cartesian “I” who perceives 
through this body is disconnected from this 
material space and thus depends for 
perception on its ideal unity with the ideal 
materiality of the body and this body’s ideal 
relation to Descartes’s “new world.”  For the 
Cartesian “I” the experience of being 
present in space thus depends on being co-
present to an ideal materiality; but the 
ideality of this material must be absent from 
experience, since it can only be 
comprehended in thought.  The Berkeleian 
perceiver is present to immediate ideas that 
acquire the significance of “outness” that is 
proper to space, and is disconnected from all 
else.  But the significance of immediate 
ideas is rooted in anticipatory, temporal 
connections between ideas.  In one sense, 
this significance is absent, because it is 
deferred to the future; yet in another sense, it 
is present, because the anticipatory relations 
have a natural clarity and presence in virtue 
of God’s authorship of the linguistic 
structure that undergirds anticipations. 
For the Cartesian perceiver, then, 
being in space and being present to things in 
depth means being in some sense absent 
from the material spatiality that this 
experience signifies.  For the Berkeleian 
perceiver, having such experiences means 
being in some sense absent from the 
temporalised ideal relation that gives 
spatiality its significance.  In both cases we 
can be present to things in depth because we 
are not fully absented from the missing 
element indicated above—this element is 
ideally present in virtue of God.  To return 
to the linguistic model of depth: for 
Descartes, the encoding language of depth 
can speak to us because the ‘book of nature’ 
is God’s code-book; and for Berkeley, the 
language of depth can be learnt because 
nature is God’s langue (in the Saussurian 
sense) and our experience is exposed to the 
parole of God’s visual language from day 
one.  But God’s code-book and langue are 
ultimately beyond our being and are ideal. 
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These studies of the sorts of idealisms 
that emerge from Descartes’s and 
Berkeley’s encounter with the optical 
experience of depth lead to some significant 
consequences.  They suggest that the 
analysis of the optical works can contribute 
toward current discussions of Descartes’s 
and Berkeley’s philosophy in general.  I do 
not want to dwell on this here, since this 
would spread into a vast and growing 
critical project.  But reflection on their 
accounts of depth does suggest 
complexities, confusions and tensions in the 
sorts of trajectories that we traditionally 
indicate when we call Descartes a 
“rationalist” and Berkeley an “empiricist.”  
Mechanism is quite obviously integral to 
Descartes’s rationalism, yet it is problematic 
since it demands ideas outside us in matter; 
and ideal structures that transcend 
experience seem crucial to Berkeley’s 
immaterialist empiricism.  In fact, both my 
analyses suggest that the motivating 
experiential tension in each account—that 
depth is not fully present in the ideas 
through which we encounter depth—would 
be better satisfied by Kant’s transcendental 
argument.  But then we could say that all 
that Kant does, is embrace this inherent, 
problematic structure of presence and 
absence in our experience of space and raise 
it to an even higher ideality by saying that 
space could never be present unless it were 
all and only a pure intuition—and all this 
does is give us a new and even more 
complex understanding of structures of 
presence and absence in experience.  This 
transcendental move does not really address 
the problem, so much as convert it into an 
essential principle—which is precisely the 
point of a transcendental argument. 
On the other hand, the tradition of 
existential phenomenology tries to discern 
the essence of such principles without 
raising their essence into a pure ideality, it 
tries to put “essences back into existence,”49  
to find transcending in contingency.  The 
above study provides an illuminating 
contrast that can situate the fundamental 
move of existential phenomenology with 
respect to the problem of depth perception 
and spatiality.  I have suggested that 
Descartes and Berkeley interpret our 
fundamental experience of depth perception 
as indicating that we are in space: space is 
something excluded from us and beyond us, 
even though we are lodged within it from 
the start.  Space is ultimately beyond our 
ideas and thus ends up rooted in an ideality 
supported by God.  Existential 
phenomenology conceives our fundamental 
experience of depth perception through quite 
a different pre-positional relation: we are of 
space, not in space.50   Our situated 
existence is fundamentally spatial from the 
ground up, and the existential-
phenomenological account of space will 
therefore be shaped by an analysis of the 
structures intrinsic to ourselves as spatial 
beings.  We are not perceivers of ideas who 
look into space through an optical structure, 
but embodied beings for whom spatiality is 
a primordial issue at every level of our 
being.  The language of depth is not a 
connecting system of ideas that is beyond 
us, depth is a primordial langue and parole 
of our existence, since our existence is 
constituted by working to implace ourselves 
within a spatial world that we permeate, and 
that permeates us. 
This suggests that the optical idealisms 
that follow from Descartes’s and Berkeley’s 
languages of depth, which languages 
insulate us from the world through the 
disconnecting connections of ideal 
structures, mark out tensions and rifts that 
can only be overcome through a 
fundamental shift in our understanding of 





1 I am grateful to Graeme Nicholson, Henry 
Pietersma, John Russon and H.S. Harris for their 
comments on earlier versions of this material, and to 
Emilia Angelova for her comments on this paper. I 
would also like to acknowledge the financial support 
from the Doctoral Fellowships program of the Social 
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of 
Canada. 
2 This intertwining of ontology and our experience of 
depth has been taken up in different ways by Sartre 
in Being and Nothingness, Heidegger in Being and 
Time, and Merleau-Ponty in Phenomenology of 
Perception and especially in “Eye and Mind.” 
3 Throughout I use distance to mean distance from 
us.  Both Descartes and Berkeley took the case of 
perception of distance from us to the object to be 
especially problematic, and distinct from the problem 
of perceiving distance between objects beside one 
another.  For the sake of discussion, I take this 
distinction as unproblematic.  The distinction seems 
natural enough if we presume that we are essentially 
given a two dimensional picture of objects.  But 
careful reflection on Descartes’s and Berkeley’s 
philosophical positions, as I articulate them below, 
would show that height and breadth could not in the 
end be any less problematic if we consider height and 
breadth to belong to objects in depth.  Compare 
Merleau-Ponty’s remark, in his discussion of 
Cartesian and Berkeleian positions, that depth 
appears as the most ‘existential’ of dimensions, and 
his subsequent remark that breadth and height are 
also existential dimensions (Phénoménologie de la 
perception (Saint-Amand, France: Galimard, 1945), 
296 and 309; Phenomenology of Perception, trans. 
Colin Smith (New Jersey: The Humanities Press, 
1962), 256 and 267).  Also see Edward S. Casey, 
“The Element of Voluminousness: Depth and Place 
Re-examined,” in Merleau-Ponty Vivant, ed. M. C. 
Dillon (Albany: SUNY Press, 1991).  I take this 
distinction and the correlate assumption that the 
problem of distance is fundamentally a problem of 
recovering three dimensions from two dimensions to 
be symptomatic of a problem that is central to both 
Descartes’s and Berkeley’s as well as other more 
recent accounts.  (See William Epstein, “The 
Metatheoretical Context,” in Perception of Space and 
Motion, eds. William Epstein and Sheena Rogers 
(San Diego: Academic Press, 1995), 1-22, for a 
synopsis of scientific conceptions of the problem of 
recovering three dimensions from two.) 
4 See Turbayne for a contrast between Descartes’s 
mechanism and Berkeley’s language based theory in 
George Berkeley, Works on Vision, ed. Colin Murray 
Turbayne (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 
1963).  In contrast to Turbayne, I want to show that 
Descartes’s theory also stems from an understanding 
of language, albeit a mechanical understanding.  
Turbayne (page xvii) agrees with Kant that Berkeley 
held that space is known only by means of 
experience, but I want to show how the essential 
structure of Berkeley’s visual language depends on a 
structure beyond human mind.  
5 The World in René Descartes, The Philosophical 
Writings of Descartes, trans. John Cottingham, 
Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch, vol. 1 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), AT 
XI:3-4; Le Monde in vol. XI of René Descartes, 
Ouevres de Descartes, publiés par Charles Adam et 
Paul Tannery, (Paris: J. Vrin, 1964), hereafter AT. 
6 See The World Chapter 1, “On the Difference 
Between our Sensations and the Things That Produce 
Them”, Chapter 6, “Description of a New World, and 
on the Qualities of the Matter of Which it is 
Composed” and Chapter 7, “Laws of Nature.” 
7 See The World, AT XI:3-4. 
8 Descartes began work on The World in 1629 and 
abandoned publication plans in 1633 after Galileo 
was condemned.  Discourse on the Method, Optics, 
Meteorology and Geometry were published in 1636, 
and the Meditations in 1641.  See the chronology in 
de Buzon’s edition (René Descartes, Discours de la 
méthode suivi de La Dioptrique, édition établie et 
présentée par Frédéric de Buzon (Saint-Amand: 
Galimard, 1991)); cf. the chronology in Cottingham 
et. al.’s edition. 
9 Optics, Discourse I, AT VI: 84-85, in René 
Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 
trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald 
Murdoch, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985); La Dioptrique in de Buzon’s edition. 
10 Optics, Discourse IV, AT VI: 112. 
11 Optics, Discourse I, AT VI: 84-85. 
12 Cf., e.g., Descartes’s argument in Meditation Six 
of the Meditations that anything that he can conceive 
clearly and distinctly can be created by God. 
13 See Optics Discourse IV and René Descartes, 
Treatise on Man, trans. Thomas Steele Hall 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), 
especially the discussion of the uninterrupted 
movement of fibres at AT XI:144. 
14 Optics, Discourse V, AT VI: 114.  Cf. Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, L'Oeil et l'Esprit (Saint-Amand, 
France: Galimard, 1964), section 3. 
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15 Optics, Discourse VI, AT VI: 141.  Cf. Descartes’s 
wax experiment in Meditation Two in the 
Meditations, in which soul’s judgement is 
constitutive of the wax’s identity. 
In the Treatise on Man, Descartes suggests that 
the motions on the “interior surface of the brain,” on 
the pineal gland, do trace an image that is in fact 
projected on the back of the eye (AT XI: 175).  In 
AT XI: 177 Descartes seems to say that the figures 
imprinted on the pineal gland are themselves ideas, 
and that these are subsequently contemplated by the 
soul.  From the point of view of the optics, this 
would mean that the soul would have to have “yet 
other eyes” that it would use to contemplate images 
(cf. the argument at AT VI: 130), which would beg 
the question. 
16 Descartes has two other accounts of depth 
perception—an account based on the distinctness and 
intensity of the object and an account based on 
focus—that are logically equivalent with respect to 
the issues that I discuss, and are subject to parallel 
criticisms. For recent reviews of relevant accounts of 
depth perception, see Barbara Gillam, “The 
Perception of Spatial Layout from Static Optical 
Information,” in Perception of Space and Motion, 
eds. William Epstein and Sheena Rogers (San Diego: 
Academic Press, 1995), 23-67; also see other articles 
in Epstein and Rogers. 
In Descartes on Seeing: Epistemology and 
Visual Perception (Carbondale: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1993) Celia Wolf-Devine argues 
that all three accounts operate mechanically and do 
not require an intellectual judgement. In this case the 
accounts, including the triangulation account, would 
not fall to my criticisms. But my criticisms of Wolf-
Devine’s claim show why the distinctness and focus 
accounts would fall to my criticism, and these 
criticisms would also hold of Wolf-Devine’s claim 
about the triangulation account (see note 18.). 
17 This backward tracing (inverse projection) is 
possible because Descartes has shown (Discourse V) 
that, given the laws of optics and the geometry of the 
eye and its lens, there is a more or less one to one 
mapping between points on the back of the eye and 
points on a picture plane in front of the eye.  This one 
to one mapping is thus another assumption that 
Descartes has to make about the world. 
18 There is a dispute in the literature as to whether the 
operation in the case of vision actually involves a 
judgement.  I claim that it does, as does Nancy L. 
Maull (“Cartesian Optics and the Geometrization of 
Nature,” in René Descartes: Critical Assessments, ed.  
Georges J.D. Moya, vol. IV, (London: Routledge, 
1991)).  On the basis of Descartes’s word choice in 
the French edition, Wolf-Devine argues that it does 
not, although she acknowledges that the Replies to 
the Sixth Objections support the contrary 
interpretation (Descartes on Seeing: Epistemology 
and Visual Perception (Carbondale: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1993), 74-75).  Suppose we accept 
Wolf-Devine’s argument, despite Descartes’s claim 
in the Optics that it is the soul that sees, not the eyes 
(AT VI:141).  Seeing distance, then, does not require 
an intellectual judgement, rather our muscles and 
brain are configured in advance by God so as to 
mechanically produce knowledge of distance in us.  
But this just means that the causal inference 
backward from motions to distance is carried out by a 
causal mechanism instead of the soul.  The process 
that allows us to know distance is still fixed in 
advance, and can be so fixed because of the 
‘geometry’ of the world, light, eyes, nerves, and so 
on—in this respect Descartes is markedly different 
from Berkeley.  This would still lead to the results 
that I develop, which could be put in the following 
way if we were to develop them within Wolf-
Devine’s interpretation: (1) God is required, external 
to human experience, to ensure that the geometrical 
relation embodied by the mechanical judgement 
mechanism accurately reflects the geometry of the 
world, and (2) the body and its mechanisms must 
have a peculiar, ideal doubling, since bodies are both 
sized objects in the world like any other, yet their 
mechanical structures are an ideal ground of their 
function as veridical measurers of the world. 
I would also argue that Wolf-Devine’s position 
adds a complication to feasible interpretations of 
Descartes’s account, since we would have to explain 
how a mechanism can achieve binocular fusion of the 
image, so as to properly triangulate the eyes, without 
there being an image available to the mechanism, 
since on Descartes’s argument there is no image 
external to mind. 
Note that Wolf-Devine’s claim that Descartes’s 
focus and distinctness accounts of distance 
perception are mechanical would also be susceptible 
of the same sort of criticism. 
19 Optics, Discourse VI, AT VI: 137-138. 
20 The angles in question should be taken as distances 
because they are, logically speaking, nothing other 
than distances under another aspect, just because 
there is a determinate relation between angular and 
linear distance in natural geometry.  This determinate 
relation is captured by the relational structure of a 
triangle’s measures, and this relational structure is in 
turn determinative of the mathematical geometry of 
the space in question.  (Cf., e.g., Ideas of Space: 
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Euclidean, Non-Euclidean and Relativistic, second 
edition, by Jeremy Gray (Oxford University Press: 
1989).) 
21 Cf. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, La structure du 
comportement (Paris: Quadrige/Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1942), 204-205; Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behaviour, trans. 
Alden L. Fisher (London: Methuen, 1965), 190.  
Merleau-Ponty notes that Descartes’s philosophy 
leads to three orders of events that are external to one 
another: events of nature, organic events, and those 
of thought; he links this to his interpretation of 
images in the Optics and the doubling of the body.  
Also cf. Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the ready 
made world in the Phenomenology of Perception, 
particularly in the chapter on space.  
22 NTV §2 (in George Berkeley, Works on Vision, ed. 
Colin Murray Turbayne (Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press, 1963)). 
A terminological clarification is warranted 
here.  Atherton argues that Berkeley’s commentators 
confuse the issue of distance, which is metrical, with 
the issue of depth, which she takes to be qualitative, 
and outness, which is the issue of whether things are 
outside us at all (Margaret Atherton, Berkeley's 
Revolution in Vision (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1990), 73-76).  She argues that Berkeley’s 
criticism of the Cartesian account in NTV is 
motivated by the problem of metrical judgements of 
distance.  While distance, depth and outness can and 
should be distinguished, I would argue that they are 
interdependent and inseparable phenomena, for 
reasons that I suggest in the beginning of the paper.  
A critical analysis would therefore show that the 
support that Atherton offers for her argument is 
misguided.  More, to the extent that she tacitly 
acknowledges that Berkeley’s criticism of the 
geometric account of distance perception does not 
just institute a new quantitative perceptual apparatus, 
but an essentially different, non-geometrical account 
of perception, Atherton herself cannot separate depth, 
distance and outness. 
See also Lorne Falkenstein, “Intuition and 
Construction in Berkeley's Account of Visual Space,” 
Journal of the History of Philosophy 32 (1994): 63-
84, and Robert Gray, “Berkeley's Theory of Space,” 
Journal of the History of Philosophy 16 (1978): 415-
434, who point out that in NTV §112 Berkeley uses 
“distance” to mean the number of points between two 
other points, and not just the distance outward from 
the observer as Armstrong suggests (D.M. 
Armstrong, Berkeley's Theory of Vision (Victoria, 
Australia: Melbourne University Press, 1960)).  But 
Falkenstein and Gray show that despite this usage in 
NTV §112, distance in Armstrong’s sense is 
Berkeley’s main preoccupation.  Note that Armstrong 
argues that “distance” covers what Atherton would 
call “distance” and “depth.” 
In my discussion of Berkeley, then, as 
throughout the paper, I intend “depth” to include 
“distance,” and “distance” to mean the distance 
between ourselves and objects, not the distance 
between objects. 
23 Throughout this section I use the word “idea” in 
Berkeley’s sense.  Berkeley uses “idea” to designate 
both concepts that we have in thought (for example, 
mathematical or philosophical ideas) and what might 
be called “sensations” in current discourse (for 
example, colours, sounds or smells).  Sensations 
cannot be traced back to any other ideas, and 
Berkeley often calls them ideas of sense, ideas 
perceived or immediate ideas.  (Cf., e.g., Principles 
§1 and VL §§9-11.) The latter is the term that I use 
when referring to “sensations.”  
My understanding of the immediacy of ideas is 
quite different than the one proposed by Schwartz 
(Vision: Variations on Some Berkeleian Themes 
(Cambridge: Blackwell,1994), esp. 10 ff.). Schwartz 
gives a positive explanation of immediate ideas, in 
the sense that his explanation refers to physiological 
and empirical factors. On my understanding, 
immediate ideas are better understood in negative 
terms, that is, they are ideas that are not mediated by 
other ideas, and given Berkeley’s inward turn, it is 
best not to refer immediate ideas to any positivity 
outside of ideas. 
24 Cf. NTV §§9-10 and §19.  For purposes of 
discussion I take Berkeley’s ‘point on the retina’ 
argument as successful.  This argument has been 
subject to much criticism in the literature.  See Gary 
Thrane, “Berkeley's "Proper Object of Vision",” 
Journal of the History of Ideas 38 (1977): 243-260; 
Robert Gray, “Berkeley's Theory of Space,” Journal 
of the History of Philosophy 16 (1978): 415-434; 
D.M. Armstrong, Berkeley's Theory of Vision 
(Victoria, Australia: Melbourne University Press, 
1960); and Margaret Atherton, Berkeley's Revolution 
in Vision (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).  
25 Cf. NTV §3. 
26 Cf. NTV §§3-5, 12-15. 
Although Berkeley does not name Descartes in 
the body of his text, the triangulation argument that 
he explicates is essentially the same as Descartes’s 
and in §42 he discusses the example of the blind man 
performing a triangulation with two sticks.  An 
excerpt from Discourse VI of Descartes’s Optics, 
including the triangulation account of distance, was 
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published as an appendix to the second edition of 
NTV.  A footnote in Berkeley’s fourth and last 
edition (1732) refers the reader to “Descartes and 
others.”  (See Turbayne’s edition in Works on 
Vision.) So it is quite reasonable to take Berkeley’s 
criticism as directed against Cartesian accounts. 
27 Cf. NTV §12 and §19.  
28 Berkeley’s doctrine in A Treatise Concerning the 
Principles of Human Knowledge (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1982, hereafter Principles) would seem to 
rule out the latter possibility.  Cf. Maull’s claim that 
Berkeley’s criticisms miss the mark, since Descartes 
never claimed that we explicitly know the angles and 
calculations involved, and that Berkeley’s real 
contribution is in his criticism of the geometrical 
basis of Descartes’s account ( “Cartesian Optics and 
the Geometrization of Nature,” in René Descartes: 
Critical Assessments, ed. Georges J.D. Moya, vol. IV 
(London: Routledge, 1991), 263-4).  Atherton makes 
the same point (Berkeley's Revolution in Vision 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 79-80).  
Wolf-Devine’s interpretation of Descartes’s 
triangulation account would support Maull and 
Atherton (Celia Wolf-Devine, Descartes on Seeing: 
Epistemology and Visual Perception (Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1993), 74-75). 
29 My thanks to H.S. Harris for pointing out the 
significance of this point. 
30 See NTV §23 and §25. 
31 Cf. NTV §§16-18. 
32 NTV §32, cf. §§28-39 for Berkeley’s discussion of 
the problem of distance perception through lenses, etc., 
which was posed by Dr.  Barrow.  Note that an “eye 
strain” account runs parallel to the 
“blurredness/confusion” account; basically, we feel eye 
strain when we try to resolve blurred images, and this 
strain can be connected with the distance of the object. 
33 Cf. Gary Thrane, “Berkeley's "Proper Object of 
Vision",” Journal of the History of Ideas 38 (1977): 
243-260 for a distinction between three versions of 
this argument; the claim made here would draw on 
the phenomenological version.  With respect to the 
painter, note that many critics have pointed out that it 
is quite difficult to learn to see in ‘two dimensions,’ 
as the painter is supposed to.  The more profound 
criticism is given in R. G. Collingwood, Principles of 
Art (New York: Oxford University Press, 1938), 144-
151, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, L'Oeil et l'Esprit 
(Saint-Amand, France: Galimard, 1964), namely that 
to conceive painting as a collapse of three 
dimensions into two is to engage in a bad 
metaphysical construal of painting, and what we must 
understand is that the painter paints with her body, 
which is intrinsically a being of depth.  For Merleau-
Ponty this metaphysical analysis of painting shows 
that depth perception as well is truly an activity of 
body qua being of depth.  
34 Cf. Principles, §§24-26, §8. 
35 In George Berkeley, Works on Vision, ed. Colin 
Murray Turbayne (Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press, 1963), §13.  See Turbayne’s 
introduction to Works on Vision for a detailed 
discussion of the role of the concept or metaphor of 
language in Berkeley’s discussion of vision. In 
Vision: Variations on Some Berkeleian Themes 
(Cambridge: Blackwell,1994), 10 ff., Robert 
Schwartz suggests that Descartes and Berkeley use 
the metaphor of language for the same purpose, but 
as I contend, the structure of language is quite 
different in their accounts. 
36 VL §38, Berkeley’s italics.  Cf. NTV §147. 
37 See Gerhard Richter’s ‘photo-realistic’ paintings 
for artworks that are deliberately ‘out of focus’ and 
have a peculiar perceptual presence that seems to 
refuse unambiguous solidity and distance. 
38 See Patricia S. Churchland, Vilayanur S. 
Ramachandran, and Terrence J. Sejnowski, “A 
Critique of Pure Vision,” in Large scale neuronal 
theories of the brain: Computational neuroscience, 
eds. Christof Koch and Joel L. Davis (Cambridge, 
MA, US: MIT Press, 1994), 23-60, for particular 
examples of cognate circularities in the 
computational analysis of vision.  
It is not clear to me how experience would 
actually sort itself out for Berkeley, unless we 
suppose (1) that one sense—which in Berkeley’s case 
would be touch—is more immediately in contact 
with its object and (2) that there is no difficulty 
transferring properties determined in this sensorium 
to another sensorium.  But claim (2) is precisely 
problematised by Berkeley’s doctrine in the 
Principles, and claim (1) becomes problematic (as we 
shall see) when we ask how it is that we learn to 
perceive tangible distance. 
39 NTV §45. 
40 NTV §46.  Cf. Berkeley’s comments about hearing 
in NTV §45 and §47.  To explain why we do not 
easily mix up the tangible distances and the audible, 
but we do easily mix up the tangible distances and 
the visible, Berkeley appeals to the linguistic model 
for visual depth perception.  Just as language 
becomes transparent to us when we are familiar with 
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it, the visual language of depth becomes transparent 
too, and we forget that seeing an object at a distance 
really means anticipating a future tangible 
experience—and the visual language of depth is far 
more transparent than the audible language of depth.  
(NTV §51.  Cf. VL §48, and Alciphron, Fourth 
dialogue, end of §11 and §12 in George Berkeley, 
Works on Vision, ed. Colin Murray Turbayne 
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1963).  
Also compare Descartes’s point that we do not notice 
the inferential structure of depth perception because 
this structure, like everyday language becomes 
transparent to us (discussed on page 3 ff. above).) 
41 NTV §46. 
42 NTV §94. 
43 Here, for the purposes of brevity, I conflate two 
questions: one is how immediate ideas of one sense 
connect together to form a mediate idea within the 
same sensory domain, for example, how we have the 
idea that an object is confused or united in a figure; 
the other is how ideas of one sense get connected to 
ideas of another sense. 
Concerning these questions, it becomes an 
issue whether Berkeley is an ‘intuitionist’ or a 
‘constructivist’ with respect to all aspects of vision, 
or with respect to three dimensional vision only, and 
not two dimensional vision.  See Lorne Falkenstein, 
“Intuition and Construction in Berkeley's Account of 
Visual Space,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 
32 (1994): 63-84 for a review of some of the issues, 
and an argument that ultimately claims that Berkeley 
is an ‘intuitionist’ with respect to two dimensional 
vision, even if this is not unambiguous and there is 
evidence for the other side.  
In the context of Berkeley’s works on vision, 
the question as to whether two dimensional structures 
(lines, planes, figures, etc.) are immediately given in 
vision without ‘construction’ by the mind is entwined 
with interpretation of Berkeley on minima visibilia.  
Robert Gray, “Berkeley's Theory of Space,” Journal 
of the History of Philosophy 16 (1978): 415-434 
focuses on minima visibilia as does Falkenstein’s 
article, and both are worthy of criticism.  I see 
nothing incompatible with holding that there are 
minimum visibles and that height and breadth are 
given by ‘counting’ minimum visibles, while at the 
same time holding that a ‘construction’ on minimum 
visibles is necessary to give apparent line and figure.  
More important, it is central to Berkeley’s doctrine 
that minimum visibles are immediate, but depth is 
mediate, so even if we grant that apparent line and 
figure are intuited (i.e., that there is an inherent order 
that mediates immediate minimum visibles in an 
array, which already seems to be a contradiction), 
this does not mean that what appears to be a line 
signifies a line.  There is nothing in immediate ideas 
that could determine whether two adjacent minimum 
visibles signify two distant objects, or a short linear 
object in the ‘picture plane,’ or two different points 
close up, and so on.  Since minimum visibles are 
precisely immediate, there is nothing intrinsic to 
them that can indicate whether they belong together 
in a figure, unless we presume that all minimum 
visibles conform precisely to points on a single 
picture plane in front of us, which we cannot, which 
is precisely why distance—the possibility of things 
being in more than one plane—is an issue for us.  
There is no sense in which immediate experience of 
minimum visibles is unambiguously two or three 
dimensional and there is no sense in which minimum 
visibles unambiguously form figures.  In “The 
Spaces of Berkeley's World,” in Berkeley: Critical 
and Interpretive Essays, ed. Colin M.  Turbayne 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 
Thrane claims that Berkeley’s visual space 
corresponds to neither a normal two or three 
dimensional Euclidean manifold but is more like 
Mach’s meta-geometrical space, which backs up this 
point.  It may be true, as Falkenstein argues, that 
Berkeley could define a line as the shortest distance 
between two points (page 70), but this would be a 
line in thought—not every experienced set of 
minimum visibles that conforms to this definition 
therefore immediately signifies the experience of a 
line.  We already have to know distance to know the 
significance of the points, which is why, for example, 
the interrelation between size and distance is tricky. 
My exposition, however, does not hinge on the 
success of the argument that Berkeley is a 
‘constructivist’ when it comes to two dimensional 
space, since the issue of distance ends up being 
temporal for Berkeley, and he cannot be an 
‘intuitionist’ about associations whose significance 
builds over time. 
44 NTV §147. 
45 Alciphron, in George Berkeley, Works on Vision, 
ed. Colin Murray Turbayne (Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press, 1963), Fourth Dialogue, §11. 
46 Alciphron, Fourth Dialogue, §15. 
47 NTV §152. 
48 This claim about space would be in keeping with 
Berkeley’s criticism of Newtonian space (see 
Principles §116).  
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49 See Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la 
perception, “Avant-Propos,” I; Phenomenology of 
Perception, “Preface,” vii. 
50 See Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la 
perception, “La spatialité du corps propres et la 
motricité”; Phenomenology of Perception, “The 
Spatiality of One’s Own Body and Motility.” See 
also Edward S. Casey, Getting Back into Place: 
Toward a Renewed Understanding of the Place-
World (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University 
Press, 1993). 
